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ABSTRACT
We study the distributional effects of a pollution tax in general equilibrium, with general forms of
substitution where pollution might be a relative complement or substitute for labor or for capital in
production. We find closed form solutions for pollution, output prices, and factor prices. Various
special cases help clarify the impact of differential factor intensities, substitution effects, and output
effects. Intuitively, the pollution tax might place disproportionate burdens on capital if the polluting
sector is capital intensive, or if labor is a better substitute for pollution than is capital; however,
conditions are found where these intuitive results do not hold. We show exact conditions for the
wage to rise relative to the capital return. Plausible values are then assigned to all the parameters,
and we find that variations over the possible range of factor intensities have less impact than
variations over the possible range of elasticities.
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heutel@eco.utexas.edu  Policy  makers  need  to  know  the  distributional  effects  of  environmental taxes.  
Previous studies that find environmental taxes to be regressive have focused on the uses 
side of income, that is, how low-income consumers use a relatively high fraction of their 
income to buy gasoline, electricity, and other products that involve burning fossil fuel.  
Yet these studies ignore the sources side of income.  Environmental policies can have 
important effects on firms’ demands for capital and labor inputs, which can impact the 
returns to owners of capital and labor in a general equilibrium setting.   
The literature in public economics contains much work on general equilibrium tax 
incidence, but the literature on environmental taxation has focused mostly on efficiency 
effects.  As reviewed below, neither literature yet has studied the general equilibrium 
incidence of a pollution tax in a model with general forms of substitution.  Environmental 
tax  incidence  has  been  studied  only  in  partial  equilibrium  models,  in  computational 
general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models,  or  in  analytical  general  equilibrium  models  with 
limited  forms  of  substitution.    This  paper  provides  a  theoretical  general  equilibrium 
model  of  the  incidence  of  an  environmental  tax  that  allows  for  differential  factor 
intensities and fully general forms of substitution among inputs of labor, capital, and 
pollution.  We show incidence on the sources side as well as the uses side. 
  Many empirical studies provide partial equilibrium analyses of the incidence of an 
environmental tax.  For example, Robison (1985) examines the distribution of the costs 
of pollution abatement from 1973-1977 and finds regressive burdens equal to 1.09% of 
the income of the lowest income class and only 0.22% of income for the highest income 
class.  Using CGE models, Mayeres (1998) and Metcalf (1999) look at various ways to 
return the revenue from an environmental tax, showing that these distributional effects 
can more than offset the incidence of the environmental tax itself.  Morgenstern et al 
(2002) discuss four CGE studies that examine various distributional effects of carbon 
policy, but none derive analytical results and none show effects on factor prices.
1 
  Previous  theoretical  work  on  environmental  tax  incidence  by  Rapanos  (1992, 
1995) models pollution in one sector as a negative externality that affects production in 
the other sector.  The model is somewhat restrictive in two respects.  First, the externality 
has a specific effect on production in the other sector, which affects incidence.  Second, 
Rapanos assumes that that pollution bears a fixed relation to output (or to capital input) of 
the polluting sector, so a tax on pollution has the same incidence as a tax on output (or on 
capital input).  In contrast, this paper models pollution as a variable input to the dirty 
sector’s production function.  In response to any price change, the producer can change 
the  mix  of  labor,  capital,  and  pollution.    In  particular,  pollution  can  be  a  relative 
complement  or  substitute  for  labor  or  capital,  so  that  a  pollution  tax  can  change  the 
relative demands for those other two factors and affect their relative returns.   
Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) examine the efficiency costs of a revenue-neutral 
environmental tax swap and also solve for the change in the wage rate.  Their analytical 
model considers variable pollution, but the production function has a single elasticity of 
substitution among the three inputs (capital, labor, and pollution).  This formulation does 
not allow for relative complementarity of inputs in production, a possibility that drives 
                                                 
1 Also, West and Williams (2002) use micro data to model demand equations and empirically estimate the 
distribution of burdens of environmental policy.  Parry (2004) examines the distribution of the scarcity 
rents created by grandfathered emissions permits.  In a model with unemployment, Wagner (2005) shows 





significant  results below.
2  Chua (2003) presents a model where pollution is a scalar 
multiple of output, but it can be lowered by paying an abatement sector that also uses 
labor and capital.  Because the effect on factor prices depends on use of factors in the 
abatement sector, this model effectively makes some restrictions on the ways that firms 
can substitute out of pollution and into other factors such as labor and capital.
3 
Our model does not fix pollution as a scalar multiple of output, nor of capital, nor 
does it posit a third sector for abatement.  Rather, pollution is modeled as an input along 
with capital and labor.  Minimal restrictions are placed on that production function, so 
that  the  model  is  free  to  consider  that  any  pair  of  inputs  may  be  complements  or 
substitutes.  We then solve the model in the style of Harberger (1962) to find closed form 
solutions for the general equilibrium responses to a change in the tax on pollution, in the 
presence of other taxes.  The model allows for analyses of a wide variety of policies. 
Some of the general results are complex and ambiguous, so special cases are used 
to provide intuition.  In the case where the two sectors have equal capital-labor ratios, for 
example, an increase in the pollution tax unambiguously raises the price of the dirty good 
relative to the clean good.  We then show specific conditions for the pollution tax to raise 
or lower the equilibrium wage-rental ratio.  Most of these results are intuitive, but some 
are surprising.  One might think that the pollution tax raises the relative return of the 
factor that is the better substitute for pollution, but a surprising result is that the opposite 
holds  if  labor  and  capital  are  highly  complementary.    Then  the  better  substitute  for 
pollution bears proportionally more of the burden of the pollution tax.   
  Another special case allows for differential factor intensities but abstracts from 
differential  substitutability  for  pollution.    Normally  the  pollution  tax  then  lowers  the 
relative  return  of  the  factor  that  is  intensively  used  in  the  dirty  sector,  but  a  second 
surprising result is that the opposite holds if the dirty sector can substitute among its 
inputs more easily than consumers can substitute between outputs.  Then the factor that is 
intensively  used  in  the  dirty  sector  bears  proportionately  less  of  the  burden  of  the 
pollution tax.  A final unusual result is that even though the tax withdraws resources from 
the private economy, one of the factors could actually gain in real terms.  We provide 
explanations for these counterintuitive results. 
  The next section presents the model and uses it to derive a system of equations.  
Then the second section offers a general solution and simplifies it in several cases to 
interpret  the  results.    While  the  main  contributions  here  are  the  propositions  about 
incidence,  the  third  section  proceeds  to  insert  plausible  values  for  parameters  and  to 
calculate examples of the incidence of environmental policy.  It shows that varying the 
factor intensities over their plausible range has less impact on incidence than varying 
substitution elasticities over their plausible range.  The fourth section thus concludes that 
it is important next to estimate substitution elasticities.  This concluding section also 
                                                 
2 DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) allow for complementarity of inputs, and they derive the change in the 
wage rate, but their model is primarily used to examine the efficiency of revenue-neutral tax swaps.  To the 
extent that they examine incidence, their results are somewhat limited by the fact that capital either has an 
exogenous price or is supplied inelastically in the polluting industry. 
3 McAusland  (2003)  develops  a  theoretical  model  to  examine  the  role  of  inequality  in  endogenous 
environmental  policy  choice,  and  Aidt  (1998)  explores  how  heterogeneous  agents  may  influence 
environmental  policy  through  political  processes.      While  both  models  are  concerned  with  inequality, 
neither is strictly an examination of the incidence of environmental policy.  Likewise, Bovenberg, Goulder 





notes caveats.  Indeed, our model could be extended in many of the same ways that the 
original Harberger (1962) model was extended over the following decades.
4   
I. Model 
  The simple model developed here is used to solve for all changes in prices and 
quantities that result from an exogenous change in the pollution tax.  No government 
revenue neutrality is imposed, however, so an increase in one tax need not be offset by a 
decrease in another tax.  Instead, as in Harberger (1962) and others, the government is 
assumed to use the increased revenue to purchase the two private goods in the same 
proportion as do households.  Thus, the transfer from the private sector to the public 
sector has no effect on relative demands or on prices.  We consider a competitive two-
sector  economy  using  two  factors  of  production,  capital  and  labor.    Both  factors  are 
mobile and can be used by either sector.  A third variable input is pollution,  Z,  necessary 
to produce one of the outputs.  The constant returns to scale production functions are: 
  X = X(KX,LX)   
  Y= Y(KY,LY,Z),   
where  X  is the "clean" good,  Y  is the "dirty" good,  KX  and  KY  are the capital inputs in 
each  sector,  and    LX    and    LY    are  the  labor  inputs  in  each  sector.
5   The  resource 
constraints are: 
  K K K Y X = + , 
  L L L Y X = + , 
where  K  and    L  are  the  fixed  total  amounts  of  capital  and  labor  in  the  economy.  
Totally differentiating these two constraints yields:  
  0 ˆ ˆ = + KY Y KX X K K l l ,    (1) 
  0 ˆ ˆ = + LY Y LX X L L l l  .  (2) 
where a hat denotes a proportional change ( X X X K dK K / ˆ º ) and  ￿ij  denotes sector  j’s 
share  of  factor    i    (e.g.  K KX KX / º l ).    Notice  that    Z    has  no  equivalent  resource 
constraint.  The amount of  Z  used by the dirty sector depends only on that sector’s 
decision, with no upper limit.  To ensure finite use of pollution in the initial equilibrium, 
we start with a pre-existing positive tax on pollution.
6 
  Producers of  X  can substitute between labor and capital in response to changes in 
the gross-of-tax factor prices they face,  pL  and  pK,  according to their elasticity of 
substitution in production  ￿X.  The definition of  ￿X  is differentiated and rearranged to 
obtain the firm’s response to a change in prices,  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
K L X X X p p L K - = - s , where  ￿X  is 
defined to be positive.  The firm’s cost of capital can be written as  pK = r(1+￿K),  where  
                                                 
4 See McLure (1975) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for summaries of these extensions.  
5 As is typical in environmental models, the second production function includes pollution as an input.  
This is simply a rearrangement of a production function where both  Y  and  Z  are functions of  KY  and  LY. 
6 This problem could also be solved by introducing a private cost of pollution, separate from the tax (see 
Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001).  Here, we merely assume that the initial tax is positive and hence examine a 





r  is the net return to capital and  ￿K  is the ad valorem rate of tax on capital.  Similarly,  
pL = w(1+￿L),  where   w  is the net wage and  ￿L  is the labor tax.  Differentiating these 
equations in the same manner yields  K K r p tˆ ˆ ˆ + =   and   L L w p tˆ ˆ ˆ + = ,  where all variables 






















ˆ .  Then substitution 
into the  ￿X  expression yields the production decision: 
  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
K L X X X r w L K t t s - - + = - .  (3) 
            The choice of inputs in sector  Y  is more complicated, since it has three inputs.  
First, note that firms face no market price for pollution except for a tax, so  pZ = ￿Z  (and  
Z Z p tˆ ˆ = ,  where   Z Z Z d t t t / ˆ = ).  This tax per unit of pollution is a specific tax rather 
than an ad valorem tax.  We then follow Mieszkowski (1972) in modeling this choice of 
inputs.  As shown in the Appendix, the resulting equations are:  
  Z ZZ KZ YZ L ZL KL YL K ZK KK YK Y e e w e e r e e Z K t q t q t q ˆ ) ( ) ˆ ˆ )( ( ) ˆ ˆ )( ( ˆ ˆ - + + - + + - = -    (4) 
  Z ZZ LZ YZ L ZL LL YL K ZK LK YK Y e e w e e r e e Z L t q t q t q ˆ ) ( ) ˆ ˆ )( ( ) ˆ ˆ )( ( ˆ ˆ - + + - + + - = - ,  (5) 
where  ￿Yj  is the share of factor  j  in sector  Y’s  production, and  eij is the Allen elasticity 
of substitution between inputs  i  and  j  (Allen 1938).  This elasticity is positive when the 
two inputs are substitutes and is negative when they are complements.  Note that  eij = eji,  
that  eii < 0,  and that at least two of the three cross-price elasticities must be positive. 
  In a sense, we could avoid saying that pollution is an “input” to the production 
function  Y=Y(KY, LY, Z)  and instead just specify equations (4)-(5).  In that case, the 
Allen elasticities of substitution are a direct way to model the choices of firms.  A higher 
tax on pollution leads firms to pollute less (eZZ < 0), holding output constant, and it may 
raise or lower use of labor or capital in ways that depend on the signs and magnitudes of 
eLZ  and  eKZ.   The point is just that these reactions affect the incidence of the tax. 
  The Appendix also shows how assumptions of perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale are used to derive the following two equations: 
  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ X L XL X K XK X L w K r X p + + + + + = + t q t q ,  (6) 
  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ Z YZ Y L YL Y K YK Y Z L w K r Y p t q t q t q + + + + + + + = +  ,    (7) 
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º   is the share of sales revenue of 
sector  X  that is paid to capital, and other shares are defined similarly (￿XL,  ￿YK,  and  







q º   is the share of revenue of sector  Y  that is paid for pollution, 
through taxes.  Also note that  ￿XK +  ￿XL = 1  and  ￿YK +  ￿YL + ￿YZ = 1. 
  Totally  differentiate  each  sector’s  production  function  and  substitute  in  the 
conditions from the perfect competition assumption shown in the Appendix to yield: 
  X XL X XK L K X ˆ ˆ ˆ q q + = .         (8) 





Finally, consumer preferences for the two goods can be modeled using  ￿u,  the elasticity 
of substitution between goods  X  and  Y  in utility.
7  Differentiate the definition of  ￿u  to 
get the equation for consumer demand response to a change in prices: 
  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ












ˆ  is the change in the tax on  X  (and similarly for  ￿Y).  
  Equations  (1)  –  (10)  are  ten  equations  in  eleven  unknowns  ( , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
Y X Y X L L K K  
Z Y p X p r w Y X ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ).  Good  X  is chosen as numeraire, so  0 ˆ = X p ,  and this system of 
ten equations provides solutions to all ten unknown endogenous changes as functions of 
parameters and of an exogenous change in any of the tax rates.
8  This paper focuses on 
the effects of an exogenous increase in the pollution tax  ( Z tˆ >0). 
  Our primary purpose is to solve for incidence results, that is, the effects on output 
prices and factor prices.  Thus, to make the solution more manageable, we omit equations 
for  the  proportional  changes  in  quantities  X L L K K Y X Y X ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ,  and  Y ˆ .  We  keep  the 
proportional change in pollution, Z ˆ , since that result is of interest as well, though it is a 
quantity and not a price.   
II. Results and Interpretations 
As just mentioned, we solve for effects of an increase in the pollution tax rate,  ￿Z , 
where   0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ = = = = L K Y X t t t t .
9  As shown in the Appendix, the general solutions are:
10 
Z YZ Z u L K LZ ZZ KZ ZZ
YZ XL YK XK YL
Y e e B e e A
D
p t q t s g g
q q q q q
ˆ ˆ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( [
) (




    Z u L K LZ ZZ KZ ZZ
YZ XK e e B e e A
D
w t s g g
q q
ˆ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( [ ˆ - + - - - =  ,  (11b) 
  Z u L K ZZ LZ ZZ KZ
YZ XL e e B e e A
D
r t s g g
q q
ˆ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( [ ˆ - - - - - =  ,  (11c) 
                                                 
7 This formulation does not preclude household disutility from pollution.  Rather, the utility function is 
assumed to be separable in pollution (or environmental quality).  See Carbone and Smith (2004) for an 
analysis of the impact of non-separability of air quality and leisure in utility.  
8 Harberger (1962) chose  w  as numeraire and interpreted the expression for  dr  as the change in the return 
to capital relative to labor.  In this model, we provide expressions for both  w ˆ  and r ˆ.  These results can be 
compared to those of Harberger by considering the value of   w r ˆ ˆ- . 
9 All of the results have the same magnitude and opposite sign if the pollution tax is reduced. The other 
taxes do not change, but they are still in the model since firms and consumers in the initial equilibrium are 
responding to net-of-tax prices.  If the levels of those tax rates appear in the solution for a price change, it 
means that the effect of  tZ  on that price depends on the level of existing tax rates.  The model here could 
be solved in a way that allows these other taxes to change.  Thus it could be used with a revenue-neutrality 
constraint, so that an increase in the pollution tax is offset by a decrease in some other tax.  
10 If solely in terms of exogenous parameters, the expression for  Z ˆ  would be long.  The three preceding 
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g .    Also,  for  convenience,  this  solution 
combines  notation  into  definitions  where  YK K XK K q g q b + º ,    YL L XL L q g q b + º ,    A  º       
￿L￿K + ￿K(￿L+￿YZ),  B º ￿K￿L + ￿L(￿K+￿YZ),  and  C º ￿K+￿L+￿YZ .  It is readily apparent 
that    A>0,    B>0,    and   C>0.      The  denominator  is    D  º C￿X  +  A[￿XK￿YL(eKL-eLZ)  - 
￿XL￿YK(eKK-eKZ)] - B[￿XK￿YL(eLL-eLZ) - ￿XL￿YK(eKL-eKZ)] - (￿K-￿L)￿u(￿XK￿YL-￿XL￿YK).    
While the interpretation of this general solution is limited by its complexity, some 
basic effects can be identified.  For example, the last term in equation (11b) or (11c) is 
the “output effect” of Mieszkowski (1967): a tax on emissions is a tax only in the dirty 
sector and therefore reduces output (in a way that depends on consumer demand via  ￿u).  
Less output means less demand for all inputs, but particularly the input used intensively 
in that sector.  The term  (￿K – ￿L)  is positive when the dirty sector is capital-intensive.  
Then,  assuming    D>0,  the  output  effect  places  relatively  more  burden  on  capital.  
Whether this intuitive results holds depends on the sign of the denominator  D,  however, 
and this complicated expression cannot be signed in this general solution. 
Furthermore, the first two terms in equation (11b) or (11c) represent “substitution 
effects”.  As pollution become more costly, the dirty sector seeks to adjust its demand for 
all three inputs.  How it does so is determined by the Allen elastiticies of substitution, 
which figure prominently in those first two terms.  The constants  A  and  B  also come 
into play, weighing the impact of the elasticities on the incidence results.  These constants 
can  be  signed,  but  their  magnitudes  are  complicated  functions  of  the  factor  share 
parameters, making an interpretation difficult from these general solutions alone. 
Thus, while several effects are at work, their combination and interactions are 
quite difficult to analyze in these equations.  We therefore isolate each effect by assuming 
away the other effects in a series of special cases.  Although  A>0,  B>0, and  C>0, the 
denominator  D  cannot be signed, and so nothing definitive can be said yet about the 
effect of the pollution tax on the output price (11a), factor prices (11b,c), or even on the 
amount  of  pollution  (11d).    In  fact,  an  increase  in  the  pollution  tax  might  increase 
pollution.
11  Thus the following special cases are also useful to seek definitive results.  
Before proceeding, consider implications for who bears the burden of this tax.  On 
the sources side, the interpretation of   0 ˆ ˆ = = r w  is not that factors bear no burden, but 
                                                 
11 DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) obtain the same perverse result.  In our model, it is possible with certain 
extreme parameter values.  For an example that satisfies all of the restrictions from Allen (1938), suppose  
￿KX  = 0.2,  ￿LX  = 0.1,  ￿XK  = 0.9, ￿YK = 0.72,  ￿YZ  = 0.1,  eKL  = 2,  eKZ  = -1,  eLZ  = 5,  eZZ = -1.8,  and  ￿u  =  
￿X  = 1.  Capital and pollution are complements, while labor and pollution are strong substitutes.  The 
increase in  pZ  has a “direct effect” that reduces pollution (since  eZZ = -1.8) but a larger indirect effect that 
raises pollution.  The 10% higher  pZ  decreases demand for capital  (eKZ = -1)  and decreases its return  (r ˆ= 
-.0025).  This reduction in  r  serves to increase demand for labor  (eKL = 2).  This labor is hard to get from 
the other sector  X,  which is capital-intensive and small, so  w  rises steeply  ( w ˆ =.0223).  This big increase 





that their burdens are in proportion to their shares of national income (both  w  and  r  fall 
in real terms when  pX  is numeraire and  pY  rises).  Thus, any w ˆ >0  just means that 
labor’s burden is less than its share of income.  For labor to gain, the wage must rise by 
more than the overall price index  p º  ￿pX + (1 – ￿)pY ,  where  ￿  is the share of total 
expenditure on  X.  If  p w ˆ ˆ = , then labor bears no burden, and all of the burden must be on 
capital.  And this discussion presumes that both factors spend similarly on the two goods; 
on the uses side, if  pY  rises, the pollution tax places more burden on anybody who 
spends more than the average fraction of their income on the polluting good. 
Case 1: Equal Factor Intensities 
First, consider the case where both industries have the same factor intensities, that 
is, both are equally capital (and labor) intensive.  This amounts to setting  ￿L  and  ￿K  
equal to each other.  Let their common value be  ￿,  and note that this condition implies 
that  LY/LX = KY/KX.  In this case, the solution to the system of equations is: 
  Z YZ Y p t q ˆ ˆ =    (12a) 
  Z










=     (12b) 
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=    (12c) 
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                               …(12d) 
where   ) ( ) ( 1 KL LL YL XK KL KK YK XL X e e e e D - - - - º g q q g q q s . 
  One  of  the  most  striking  observations  from  this  solution  is  how  the  general 
expression for  Y p ˆ  in (11a) reduces to such a simple expression in (12a).  In this special 
case, then, we can provide a definite sign: 
Proposition 1A: In Case 1,  0 ˆ > Y p .  Proof: Since  0 ˆ > Z t , Equation (12a) implies  Y p ˆ >0. 
            Furthermore,  the  increase  in  the  pollution  tax  affects  this  relative  price  only 
through the share that pollution constitutes of output,  ￿YZ.  The fact that equation (11a) of 
the general solution is more complicated implies that the capital and labor intensities of 
production also effect  pY  in the general case.  Here, those effects have been assumed 
away, and the uses side of the incidence of an environmental tax is clear:  consumers of 
the dirty good bear a cost of the tax increase. 
  To interpret the incidence on the sources side, or the effect of a change in the 
pollution  tax  on  returns  to  inputs,  we  must  know  something  about  the  sign  of  the 
denominator  D1.  Note that it can be written as: 





Therefore,   0 1 > D   if and only if  
) ( YL XK YK XL




q q q q g
g q q g q q s
+
+ + -
> .  Call this last 
inequality “Condition 1”.  The expression to the right of the inequality sign is strictly 
negative, so  eKL > 0  is sufficient but not necessary for Condition 1.  Remember that  eij  
is positive whenever inputs  i  and  j  are substitutes, and negative for complements.  To 
make the denominator  D1 > 0,  it is not necessary that capital and labor are substitutes in 
production of  Y  (eKL > 0), but only that they are not too complementary (Condition 1).   
  With that condition, we can interpret the effect of a change in the pollution tax 
rate on the returns to factors of production. 
Proposition 1B: In Case 1, under Condition 1,  0 ˆ > w  and  0 ˆ < r  if and only if  eLZ > eKZ.  
Proof: Since  D1 > 0  under Condition 1, Equations (12b) and (12c) imply this result.   
A special case of 1B is where labor and pollution are substitutes in sector  Y,  
while capital and pollution are complements (that is,  eLZ > 0  and  eKZ < 0).  In this case, 
the condition  eLZ > eKZ  of Proposition 1B holds, and  ￿Z  raises the wage.
12  It is not 
necessary, however, for these terms to have opposite signs.  Even if both capital and labor 
are substitutes for pollution, the relative price of labor still rises from an increase in the 
pollution tax as long as labor is a better substitute for pollution than is capital. 
  It is also of interest and quite counterintuitive to note when the above proposition 
does not hold.  If the value of  D1  is negative, then the results are exactly the opposite. 
Proposition 1C: In Case 1, but where Condition 1 does not hold,  0 ˆ > w  and   0 ˆ < r  if and 
only if  eLZ < eKZ  .  Proof:  D1 < 0, and Equations (12b) and (12c).   
            Normally with  eLZ < eKZ,  we would say that capital is a better substitute for 
pollution, so the pollution tax would tend to increase demand for capital and hence to 
increase  r.  This effect is more than offset, however, when  eLK  is sufficiently negative 
(Condition  1  does  not  hold).    Capital  and  labor  are  complementary  inputs,  and  the 
increased  demand  for  capital  also  leads  to  an  increased  demand  for  labor.    With  a 
sufficiently high degree of complementarity, this effect dominates, and  w  increases 
relative  to    r.    While  we  would  not  necessarily  expect  this  case  to  be  common,  it 
demonstrates a perverse possibility: even when both sectors have equal factor intensities, 
the better substitute for pollution can bear more of the burden of a tax on pollution.  
Case 2: Equal Factor Intensities and  eKZ = eLZ 
  On the border between those two propositions, when capital and labor are equally 
good substitutes for pollution, then neither bears a disproportionate burden of the tax.  In 
addition to  ￿K = ￿L = ￿,  suppose that  eLZ = eKZ,  and call this Case 2.
13 
                                                 
12 Note that the change in the wage rate always has the opposite sign as the change in the rental rate.  This 
follows directly from the choice of  X  as numeraire and the zero-profit equation (6).  This relationship need 
not hold for other choices of numeraire.  Only the relative change in the returns to capital and labor is of 
interest here, and this value is independent of the choice of numeraire. 
13 For an even simpler model, one could also assume  eKL = ￿X = 0.  These additional conditions are 
sufficient to think of the clean inputs  L  and  K  in fixed proportions and therefore as a single composite 
input.  Sector  X  uses only this input with no ability to substitute.  Sector  Y  has effectively only two inputs 
between which it can substitute: one is pollution and the other is this clean input.  The results with these 





Proposition 2A: In Case 2,   0 ˆ = w ,   0 ˆ = r ,  Z YZ Y p t q ˆ ˆ = ,  and 
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 Proof: Equations (12a-d), substituting in  eKZ = eLZ. 
  For factor prices, as in Case 1, equal factor intensities eliminates the output effect 
of Mieszkowski (1967).  The additional assumption of equal substitution elasticities in 
Case 2 eliminates his substitution effect.  Without either of these effects, the change in 
the pollution tax has no effect on the relative prices of capital and labor.  Then the effect 
on the price of the dirty good is the same as in Case 1.  More interesting in this case is 
that we can finally sign the effect of a change in the pollution tax on pollution. 
Proposition 2B: In Case 2,   0 ˆ < Z  .   Proof: In equation (13), note that  eZZ  is negative, 
but that all of the other parameters are positive.
14 
The purpose of this example is to reduce the general model to the simple case 
where the tax on pollution is said to have two effects that both reduce pollution.  The 
“substitution effect” is the second term in the numerator of (13), where  tZ  increases the 
relative price of pollution, which reduces pollution per unit output.  The “output effect” is 
the  first  term  in  (13),  where    tZ    increases  the  price  of  output,  which  reduces  total 
demand.
15  Thus, pollution is definitely reduced by the imposition of the tax on pollution.  
Somewhat surprisingly, this intuitive result cannot be proven in the more general case. 
Case 3: Fixed Input Proportions (eij=0) 
  By eliminating factor intensity differences, the special cases above concentrate on 
the signs of input demand elasticities.  Now we eliminate the differential effects of input 
demand elasticities in order to concentrate on relative factor intensities, (￿K – ￿L).  If this 
value is positive, then industry  Y  is capital-intensive. 
In  this  narrow  special  case,  the  production  of    Y    requires  inputs  in  fixed 
proportions.  We then expect no substitution effect, but only the output effect arising 
from the implicit tax on  Y  associated with an increase in the tax on pollution.  This 
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14 In the more general case,  eLZ   could be positive or negative, but here where  eLZ = eKZ,  the fact that  eZZ   
must be negative implies that  eLZ  =  eKZ   must be positive. 
15 This terminology appears in pollution models.  Everywhere else in this paper, we use Mieskowski' s 
(1967) terminology where output and substitution effects refer to effects on factor prices. 
16 The expression for  Z ˆ  can be evaluated using the other three expressions, but it is not included here 





where  D3 = C￿X – (￿K – ￿L)￿u(￿XK￿YL – ￿XL￿YK).  It can be shown that  (￿K – ￿L)  and  
(￿XK￿YL – ￿XL￿YK)  always have opposite sign, so  D3 > 0.  Just as in cases above, the price 
of the dirty good relative to the clean good increases unambiguously in response to an 
increase in the tax on pollution ( Y p ˆ >0) .   
More interesting is the effect on the relative return to labor and capital.  The sign 
of each of those two changes is based only on the relative factor intensities of the two 
industries,  ￿K – ￿L.  We can write this conclusion as the following: 
Proposition 3: In Case 3, if  Y  is capital-intensive, then  w ˆ > 0  and  r ˆ< 0.  Proof: 
Equations (14b,c), since  D3 > 0, and  Y  being capital-intensive means  ￿K – ￿L > 0.  
The interpretation is solely in terms of the output effect for sector  Y.  Because of 
fixed input proportions (eij=0),  a pollution tax increase is equivalent to a tax on output  Y  
and leads to decreased output of that good.  Therefore, sector  Y  demands less labor and 
less capital.  If  Y  is capital-intensive, then the fall in demand for capital exceeds the fall 
in demand for labor, and hence  r  falls relative to  w.  This simple case helps establish the 
presumption for the more surprising result of the next section. 
Case 4: Equal Elasticities of Factor Demand 
To  abstract  from  differential  input  demand  elasticities,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
suppose that all are zero.  A less restrictive way to do this is to suppose that all of the 
own-price Allen elasticities  eii  are equal to a negative constant  a1,  and that all of the 
cross-price elasticities,  eij  for  i ￿ j,  are equal to a positive constant  a2.
17  Furthermore, 
define  ￿ ￿ (a2 – a1 ) > 0.  The solution to the system then is:
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=    (15c)   
where  D4 = C￿X + ￿(A￿XL￿YK + B￿YL￿XK) – (￿K – ￿L)￿u(￿XK￿YL – ￿XL￿YK).  In this case, the 
denominator  D4  is definitely positive.  The second term is positive, since  ￿ > 0,  A > 0, 
and  B > 0.  And the remaining terms are the same as in  D3 > 0.  Thus  D4 > 0. 
  As in the other special cases, the sign of the change in the price of the dirty good 
relative to the price of the clean good is unambiguous.   
Proposition 4A: In Case 4,   0 ˆ > Y p .  Proof:  since  (￿YK￿XL – ￿YL￿XK)  has the same sign as  
(￿K – ￿L),  and  D4 > 0,  the coefficient in equation (15a) is positive.   
We can now interpret the changes in factor prices in terms of an output effect and 
substitution effect in the polluting industry.  The sign of the change in factor prices in 
(15b,c) is dependent on the signs of  (￿K – ￿L)  and  (￿u – ￿YZ￿).  The former is positive 
                                                 
17 Our Appendix discusses restrictions demonstrated by Allen (1938).  Since  eii  must be negative, Case 4 





when  Y  is capital-intensive.  In the latter,  ￿  is a measure of the overall ability of firms 
in sector  Y  to substitute among inputs.  It is equal to  eij – eii,  so a larger  ￿  means easier 
substitution away from the more costly input  (eii < 0)  and into the other inputs  (eij > 0).  
Also,  ￿u  represents the ability of consumers to substitute between  X  and  Y.  Thus, in 
combination, the expression  (￿u – ￿YZ￿)  represents whether it is relatively easier for 
consumers to substitute between goods  X  and  Y  than for producers of  Y  to substitute 
among  their  three  inputs    K,  L,    and    Z.    This  interpretation  leads  to  the  following 
proposition about an increase in the pollution tax  ￿Z: 
Proposition 4B: In Case 4, when sector  Y  is capital intensive, then  w ˆ > 0  and  r ˆ< 0  
whenever  ￿u > ￿YZ￿.  When sector  Y  is labor intensive, then w ˆ < 0 and r ˆ> 0  whenever  
￿u > ￿YZ￿ .   Proof: equations (15b) and (15c), since  D4 > 0.   
To explain,   Z tˆ >0  induces a substitution effect for producers of  Y  that increases 
demand for  K  and could be expected to increase  r.  In addition, however, the output 
effect raises the price of  Y  and reduces production.  When  Y  is capital intensive, this 
output effect reduces overall demand for capital and would tend to decrease  r.  These 
two effects work in opposite directions.  If  ￿u > ￿YZ￿,  then the output effect dominates 
the substitution effect and less capital is demanded by sector  Y.  When sector  Y  is 
capital-intensive, its reduced demand for capital outweighs sector  X’s  increased use, and 
the economy-wide  r/w  falls.  Hence the result in Proposition 4B. 
This  proposition  includes  both  the  intuitive  result  above  and  the  reverse 
counterintuitive result: abstracting from different cross-price elasticities, capital intensity 
in the dirty industry can lead to a disproportionately high burden of the pollution tax on 
labor rather than on capital.  Again, capital intensity of  Y  has two opposite effects.  On 
the one hand, it reduces  r  through the output effect, since consumers demand less of the 
capital-intensive good.  However,  ￿u < ￿YZ￿  means that effect is relatively small.  The 
larger substitution effect means that firms are trying to substitute out of  Z  and into both  
K  and  L.  The firms in  Y  want to increase both factors in proportion to their own use, 
which is capital-intensive, but they must get that capital from  X, which is labor intensive.  
They can only get that extra capital by bidding up its price. 
Case 5: All Equal Cross-Price Substitution Elasticities  
  A final special case can help with intuition and relate our model to other models 
in the literature.  Here, we impose no constraints on factor intensities but suppose that all 
cross-price substitution elasticities have the same value (su = eKL = eKZ =  eLZ  = c,  some 
constant).  We then have the following proposition: 
Proposition  5A:  In  Case  5,  regardless  of  factor  intensities,  then    w ˆ =  0,    r ˆ =  0, 
Z YZ Y p t q ˆ ˆ = ,  and   Z c Z tˆ ˆ - = .  Proof: Substitute  c  into all of equations (11). 
  It is interesting that these results are similar to those of case 2 even though case 2 
employs different assumptions (equal factor intensities and  eKZ = eLZ).  Instead, this case 
with equal substitution elastiticies is almost Cobb-Douglas, but a smaller elasticity  c<1  
implies that the tax  tZ  has less effect on pollution.  It can be shown that Cobb-Douglas 
production in the  Y  sector means,  eKL = eKZ = eLZ = 1  and  eii = (￿Yi – 1)/￿Yi  for each 
input  i.  Cobb-Douglas utility means su  = 1.  Then, with these assumptions, we have: 
Proposition 5B: If utility and production of  Y  are Cobb-Douglas, then w ˆ = 0, r ˆ= 0, 





  This Cobb-Douglas case is worth stating explicitly because of its clear intuition.  
Consumers spend a constant fraction of income on  Y, and the firms in  Y  spend a 
constant fraction of sales revenue to pay for pollution.  Thus, total spending  tZZ  is 
constant.  Then any increase in the pollution tax implies the same percent fall in pollution 
and no effect on any other factor of production.  In fact, the price  pY  rises by the same 
percentage that the quantity  Y  falls. 
III. Numerical Analysis 
  To explore the likely size of these effects, we now assign plausible values to 
parameters.  The goal here is not to calculate a point estimate for effects of a pollution tax 
on pollution and factor prices, as this model is too simple for that purpose.  Rather, the 
goal is to put numerical magnitudes on the theoretical effects derived above, to see how 
much these outcomes might be affected by changes in key parameters.  We therefore vary 
the factor intensities and substitution elasticities. Other parameters are chosen to approxi-
mate the current U.S. economy or to match estimates in the available literature.  Though 
many  of  these  parameters  have  not  been  estimated  in  the  form  required  here,  other 
structural models may be similar enough to use their parameter values in our model. 
For a definition of the “dirty” sector, we use the top thirteen polluting industries 
from the EPA’s Toxic Release  Inventory for 2002.
18 All other industries are deemed 
“clean”  for  present  purposes.    We  then  use  industry-level  data  on  labor  and  capital 
employed in the U.S., from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
19  When we add labor and 
capital across industries within each sector, we find that the 13 most polluting industries 
represent about 20% of factor income.  Therefore, our first “stylized fact” is that the clean 
sector is 80% of income.  Using the same data, we find that the capital share of factor 
income is .3985 in the clean sector and .4105 in the dirty sector.
 20  Thus the dirty sector 
is slightly capital-intensive, as consistent with prior findings (e.g. Antweiler et al, 2001, 
p. 879).  The difference is quite small, however, and we wish to avoid the perception that 
we are trying to calculate incidence with such precision.  Appropriate rounding suggests 
that the capital share in both sectors is about 40%, and so that is the second stylized fact 
used here (as a starting point, before sensitivity analysis).
21 
In the clean sector, the implication is that  ￿XK  is 0.40, and  ￿XL  is 0.60 (so  K/L  
is 2/3).  In the dirty sector, however, these data on labor and capital do not help determine 
the fraction of output attributed to the value of pollution (￿YZ).  This parameter is not in 
available data, since most industries do not pay an explicit price for pollution.  For most 
                                                 
18 The top 13 polluters are those with at least 120,000,000 pounds of on- and off-site reported releases of all 
chemicals monitored by the TRI (nearly 650 listed at http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical/index.htm).  These 
industries  are  metal  mining,  electric  utilities,  chemicals,  primary  metals,  food,  paper,  plastics, 
transportation equipment, petroleum, fabricated metals, stone/clay/glass, lumber, and electrical equipment.  
These data are publicly available at http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/industry.htm.   
19 Available online at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html.  
20 These values are also consistent with other literature.  The capital share is similar across studies, though 
again no study considers clean industries only.  Griliches and Mairesse (1998) conclude that the capital 
share is approximately 0.4, and Blundell and Bond (1998) use GMM to yield an estimate of approximately 
0.3, which rises to 0.45 when constant returns to scale is imposed.  
21 Other definitions of the dirty sector might yield more divergent factor intensities.  If it includes only 
utilities and chemicals, for example, then capital is 55% of factor income.  Also, however, that dirty sector 
is only 8% of the economy.  In that case we found very small changes in  w  and  r,  and so those results are 





pollutants in most industries, this value is implicit – a shadow value, or scarcity rent.  
Therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, we  set  ￿YZ  to 0.25, and so our third stylized fact is that 
the  dirty  industry  spends  25%  of  its  sales  revenue  on  the  pollution  input.
22   For  the 
remaining 75% to have the same  K/L  ratio as the clean sector,  ￿YK  must be 0.30, and  
￿YL  must be 0.45.  In fact, given various equations of the model, the three stylized facts 
are enough to determine all of the remaining parameters shown in Table 1.
23 
 
Table 1: Data and parameters for the case with  
equal factor intensities (where  qYZ =.25) 
KY = 0.0800  LY = 0.1200 
KX = 0.3200  LX = 0.4800 
￿KY = 0.2000  ￿LY = 0.2000 
￿KX = 0.8000  ￿LX = 0.8000 
￿YK = 0.3000  ￿YL = 0.4500 
￿XK = 0.4000  ￿XL = 0.6000 
No empirical estimates of substitution parameters are available specifically for 
our definition of the dirty sector.  The clean sector is 80% of factor income, however, so 
an economy-wide estimate represents a decent approximation of  ￿X  for the clean sector.  
Lovell (1973) and Corbo and Meller (1982) estimate the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor for all manufacturing industries.  They find an elasticity of unity, which 
we employ for  ￿X.
24  We also use unity for the elasticity of substitution in consumption 
between the clean and dirty goods,  ￿u.
25 
The only further parameters needed are the  eij  input demand elasticities in the 
dirty  sector.    The  model  includes  six  of  these  parameters,  but  only  three  can  be  set 
independently.
26   Therefore,  we  vary  only  the  three  cross-price  elasticities,  which 
effectively sets the other parameters.  To the best of our knowledge, these cross-price 
elasticities  have  never  been  estimated  with  inputs  defined  as  labor,  capital,  and 
pollution.
27  We therefore allow them to take alternative values of  -1,  -½,  0,  ½,  and  1.  
As these parameters vary, we consider the implications for the results ( Z r w pY ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ). 
                                                 
22 This parameter would be under-estimated using data from an emissions permit market such as the one in 
place for sulfur dioxide of electric utilities, since most pollutants are restricted by mandates rather than 
permits or taxes.  If shareholders own the right to emit a restricted amount of any pollutant, then they earn a 
scarcity rent that we would characterize as the return  pZZ.  In available data, this return might appear as 
part of the normal return to capital of the shareholders.  In effect, then, we suppose that existing pollution 
restrictions and shadow prices are first converted to their equivalent explicit tax rates  ￿Z.  We then evaluate 
marginal effects of environmental policy by calculating the effects of a small increase in that pollution tax.  
23 We define a unit of any input or output such that all initial prices are one ( pX = pY = pK = pL = pZ = 1).  
Then zero profit conditions imply  X = KX + LX  and  Y = KY + LY + Z.  We consider an economy with total 
factor income equal to one (which could be in billions or trillions).  Then  KX + KY + LX + LY = 1, and 
factor shares in each industry are enough to determine all  ￿’s  and  ￿’s.   
24 In a more recent paper estimating this parameter, Claro (2003) finds elasticities of approximately 0.8, 
which is close to one.  Babiker et al (2003) also use  ￿X = 1  in their computational model.  
25 This  is  the  same  initial  value  used  by  Fullerton  and  Metcalf  (2001).    Little  evidence  exists  on  the 
substitution in utility between goods produced using pollution and those produced otherwise. 
26 The Appendix defines  aij = ￿Yjeij,  where the parameters must satisfy  aiL + aiK + aiZ = 0  for all  i.  These 
restrictions together effectively determine all six Allen elasticities from only three. 
27 Humphrey  and  Moroney  (1975)  estimate  Allen  elasticities  using  capital,  labor,  and natural  resource 





In performing these calculations, we always use a 10% increase in the pollution 
tax.  Table 2 allows the Allen elasticities  eKZ  and  eLZ  to vary, holding constant the 
factor intensities.
28  Notice first that the change in pollution in the last column is always 
negative, but the magnitude of the change varies drastically in a way that depends on the 
two varied parameters.   The smallest change in pollution occurs when both of those 
parameters are zero (Z ˆ = -.0200 in row 2), but it is also small whenever the two are of 
opposite signs (e.g. row 1 or 5).  The change in pollution is larger when both are positive, 
and it is largest in the Cobb-Douglas case where all three cross-price Allen elasticities are 
equal to one (row 12).  As consistent with proposition 5B, this row shows   Z Z tˆ ˆ - = . 
 
Table 2: Effects of a 10% increase in the pollution tax,  
equal factor intensities and varying substitution elasticities  
(where  qYZ =.25 and  sX = eKL = su = 1) 
Row  eKZ  eLZ  w ˆ   r ˆ  Y p ˆ   Z ˆ  
1  1.0  -0.5  -0.00335  0.00503  0.02500  -0.02559 
2  0.0  0.0  0.00000  0.00000  0.02500  -0.02000 
3  0.5  0.0  -0.00112  0.00169  0.02500  -0.03573 
4  1.0  0.0  -0.00221  0.00331  0.02500  -0.05094 
5  -0.5  0.5  0.00230  -0.00345  0.02500  -0.02690 
6  0.0  0.5  0.00113  -0.00169  0.02500  -0.04373 
7  0.5  0.5  0.00000  0.00000  0.02500  -0.06000 
8  1.0  0.5  -0.00109  0.00164  0.02500  -0.07574 
9  -0.5  1.0  0.00341  -0.00511  0.02500  -0.04955 
10  0.0  1.0  0.00223  -0.00335  0.02500  -0.06693 
11  0.5  1.0  0.00110  -0.00165  0.02500  -0.08374 
12  1.0  1.0  0.00000  0.00000  0.02500  -0.10000 
The changes in the wage rate and capital rental rate in Table 2 are always small, 
no more than about a half of a percent in either direction.  The increase in output price is 
more substantial in Table 2, always 2.5%.  This result is no coincidence.  With equal 
factor intensities, the simple result of Case 1 and equation (12a) is  Z YZ Y p t q ˆ ˆ = .  Thus, the 
10% increase in  ￿Z  always raises the output price by 2.5%. 
The primary purpose of Table 2 is to illustrate the effects of different cross-price 
elasticities, as in Case 1 where both sectors have the same factor intensities.  Indeed, 
since  eKL = 1 satisfies Condition 1, the table reflects Proposition 1B where the pollution 
tax always imposes more burden on the relative complement to pollution, whether it be 
capital (eKZ < eLZ) or labor (eKZ > eLZ).  When neither is a relative complement (eKZ = 
eLZ),  both are burdened equally as in Proposition 2A (rows 2, 7, and 12).   
                                                                                                                                                 
materials.  They interpret energy to be a proxy for pollution, strictly valid only if pollution is fixed per unit 
of energy.    DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) review such estimates and find that  eKL = 0.5,  eKZ = 0.5,  and  
eLZ = 0.3 best summarize the existing literature.  These figures suggest that capital might be a slightly better 
substitute for energy than is labor, but the difference is not precisely estimated.  Their estimates are taken 
from data on Western European countries. 
28 The table does not contain every permutation of  eKZ  and  eLZ  between -1 and 1, because not all 
permutations are possible.  Both cannot be negative, since we know that at most one of the three cross-price 
elasticities is negative.  Furthermore, we omit combinations that result in a positive value for any  eii.  





Since  we  know  those  directions  from  the  theory,  Table  2  only  tells  us  about 
magnitudes.  How much of the burden on the sources side is shifted from one factor to 
the other?  For labor to bear no burden or to gain from raising this tax, the wage must rise 
by at least the overall price index  p º  ￿pX + (1–￿)pY,  where  ￿ = 0.75 is the share of 
expenditure on  X.  When  Y p ˆ = 0.025, the change in this price index is   p ˆ =.00625.  Thus 
w ˆ  = 0.00625 would mean that labor is held harmless, and capital bears the whole burden 
of the pollution tax.
29  In Table 2, the largest w ˆ  is 0.00341 (in row 9).  In other words, 
labor can avoid “most” of the burden when the pollution tax induces the firm to use more 
labor  (eLZ = 1)  and less capital  (eKZ = -.5). 
In the next table, we consider the impact of changes in factor intensities (with 
unchanging elasticities).  We cannot just set the cross-price elasticities equal to each 
other, however, because then Proposition 5A says we get no effects on factor prices.  
Instead, all rows of Table 3 assume  eLZ =1  and  eKZ = -.5  (as in row 9 of Table 2, with 
the largest effects on factor prices).  Then, with those elasticities fixed, we vary the factor 
intensities.  The first column shows  ￿K–￿L,  which is positive if the dirty sector is capital 
intensive.  We vary this value from -0.25 to 0.25, which effectively changes the “data” of 
the initial economy.  We then calculate new parameters  l  and  q  that are consistent with 
each other (and with a fixed overall size of each sector  X  and  Y  and fixed resource 
quantities  K  and  L ).  The second column shows corresponding increases in  ￿YK  from 
0.15 to 0.44 (and row 6 shows prior results with  ￿YK =0.30 and  ￿XK =0.40). 
 
The first five rows of Table 3 illustrate how labor can bear less than its share of 
the  burden,  even  though  the  dirty  sector  is  labor  intensive,  because  labor  is  a  better 
substitute for pollution.  As the polluting sector is changed from labor intensive to capital 
intensive, the pollution tax burden is shown to shift even more onto capital.  The fall in 
the rental rate enlarges from 0.22% to 0.83%.  The change in the wage is always positive, 
                                                 
29 This threshold can be reached when the elasticities differ by greater amounts.  Suppose  eKZ = -1  and  eLZ 
= 3, so that capital and pollution are complements, while labor and pollution are strong substitutes.  Then 
w ˆ  = .0082 > .00625, and labor gains.   
Table 3: Effects of a 10% increase in the pollution tax, varying factor 




  ￿XK  w ˆ   r ˆ  Y p ˆ   Z ˆ  
1  -0.25  0.1515  0.4495  0.0018  -0.0022  0.0258  -0.0750 
2  -0.20  0.1818  0.4394  0.0022  -0.0028  0.0257  -0.0699 
3  -0.15  0.2118  0.4294  0.0025  -0.0033  0.0256  -0.0648 
4  -0.10  0.2416  0.4195  0.0028  -0.0039  0.0255  -0.0597 
5  -0.05  0.2710  0.4097  0.0031  -0.0045  0.0253  -0.0546 
6
b  0.00  0.3000  0.4000  0.0034  -0.0051  0.0250  -0.0496 
7
  0.05  0.3286  0.3905  0.0037  -0.0057  0.0247  -0.0445 
8
  0.10  0.3566  0.3811  0.0039  -0.0064  0.0243  -0.0395 
9
  0.15  0.3841  0.3720  0.0041  -0.0070  0.0238  -0.0346 
10  0.20  0.4110  0.3630  0.0044  -0.0076  0.0233  -0.0297 
11  0.25  0.4373  0.3542  0.0045  -0.0083  0.0228  -0.0248 
a Note that  ￿K - ￿L = KY /KX  - LY /LX .
 





because labor is the better substitute for pollution, but w ˆ  rises from 0.0018 to 0.0045 as 
the dirty sector becomes more capital-intensive.  In this last row labor avoids “most” of 
the burden, relative to the threshold where w ˆ =0.00625, but labor still cannot avoid all of 
the burden – even in this combination where labor is a better substitute for pollution and 
the dirty sector is very capital intensive. 
In general, the factor intensities of the two industries are better estimated than are 
the Allen elasticities of substitution.  In Table 3, the factor intensities are varied over a 
range that is much wider than the range of possible estimates, and still the proportional 
change in the wage rate varies by only 0.0027 (from 0.0018 to 0.0045).  In contrast, 
Table 2 varies the cross-price Allen elasticities only from -0.5 to 1.0, a range that is less 
wide than the range of possible estimates, and  w ˆ   varies by more than twice as much (by 
0.0068,  from  -0.0034  to  +0.0034).    Thus,  for  the  incidence  of  the  pollution  tax,  we 
conclude that the impact of factor intensities over the plausible range is less important 
than the impact of the elasticities of substitution between pollution and capital or labor.   
IV. Conclusion 
  Using a simple general equilibrium model of production with pollution, this paper 
has found the incidence of a pollution tax on the prices of outputs and on the returns to 
inputs.  We present the system of equations that can be solved for the incidence of any 
tax on capital, labor, output, or pollution.  A small increase in the pollution tax rate alters 
the return to labor relative to capital in a way that depends on the substitutability of labor 
for pollution, the substitutability of capital for pollution, and the relative factor intensities 
of the two sectors.  When both sectors are equally capital-intensive and capital is a better 
substitute for pollution than is labor, then intuitively we expect the return to capital to rise 
relative to the wage.  If labor and capital are highly complementary, however, then this 
intuitive result does not hold.   
  Another  surprising  result  is  in  the  case  where  both  factors  are  equally 
substitutable for pollution.  In that case, the pollution tax can increase the return to capital 
even  when  the  polluting  sector  is  more  capital-intensive  than  the  other  sector,  if 
consumers are less able to substitute among goods than producers of the dirty good are 
able to substitute among their inputs.   
Numerically, it is shown that the elasticities of substitution in production between 
capital and pollution and between labor and pollution have an important effect on the 
incidence of a pollution tax.  The impact of the uncertainty about substitution elasticities 
outweighs the impact of the uncertainty about factor intensities.  
  These  results  provide  evidence  that  the  substitutability  of  capital,  labor,  and 
emissions has very important consequences for environmental policy, and that more work 
needs to be done in estimating these parameters and analyzing their effects.  Not only do 
these elasticities affect tax incidence, as shown in the main results of this paper, they 
affect  the  impact  of  environmental  policy  on  the  environment  itself.    For  alternative 
parameter values used here, a 10% increase in the pollution tax rate reduces pollution 
anywhere from 2% to 10%.  For extreme parameter values, it can lead to more pollution. 
  Further research could extend in many directions.  First, any of the simplifying 
assumptions of our model could be relaxed to see how results are affected by alternative 
assumptions such as: imperfect factor mobility, adjustment costs, imperfect competition, 
non-constant  returns  to  scale,  international  trade  in  goods  or  factors,  tax  evasion,  or 





literature that followed the original article by Harberger (1962).  In a model with perfect 
international capital mobility, for example, the net return to capital is fixed by world 
capital markets, and so the pollution tax cannot place a burden on capital – in contrast to 
the results here for effects on the wage and capital return in a closed economy. 
  Another direction for further research is to calculate the effects of these price 
changes on different income groups (or regions, or racial groups).  With data on the labor 
and capital income of each group, our results for  w ˆ   and  r ˆ  could be used to calculate 
the effect of a pollution tax on the sources of income for each group.  With additional 
data on the expenditures, our results for   Y p ˆ   could be used to calculate the effect on the 
uses side.  Finally, our analytical model could be extended to a computational general 
equilibrium (CGE) model with more factors, sectors, and groups. 
  Still, the model in this paper provides the first theoretical analysis of the incidence 
and distributional effects of environmental policy that allows for fully general forms of 
substitution  among  factors  and  that  solves  for  all  general  equilibrium  effects  of  the 
pollution tax.  The analytical model is used to derive general propositions that do not 
depend upon the particular parameter values that must be used in a CGE model.  Our 
model  also  is  used  to  identify  the  crucial  parameters.    In  particular,  we  show  how 
differential substitution between factors can greatly affect the burdens of a pollution tax. 
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Appendix  
Deriving Equations (4) – (7) 
Given a set of input prices  pK,  pL,  and  pZ,  and output decision  Y,  the solution to the 
dirty sector’s cost-minimization problem consists of three input demand functions: 
  KY = KY(pK, pL, pZ, Y) 
  LY = LY(pK, pL, pZ, Y) 
  Z = Z(pK, pL, pZ, Y) 
Totally differentiating and dividing through by the appropriate input level yields: 
Y p a p a p a K Z KZ L KL K KK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = , 
Y p a p a p a L Z LZ L LL K LK Y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = , 
Y p a p a p a Z Z ZZ L ZL K ZK ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + = , 
where  aij  is the firm’s elasticity of demand for input  i  with respect to the price of input  
j.  As Mieszkowski (1972) notes, this  aij  equals  eij￿Yj.  Note that  eij = eji,  even though   
aij ￿ aji   in general.  Also note that both  eii  and  aii  must be negative.  Allen (1938) also 
shows that  aiK + aiL + aiZ = 0.  Thus at least one of the two cross-price elasticities must 
be positive.
30 
  The  three  input  demand  functions  are  not  independent,  since  the  production 
function gives the relationship between the three inputs and output  Y.  Hence we can use 
any two of these functions.  Again following Mieszkowski, we subtract the third equation 
                                                 
30 Moreover, given symmetry (eij = eji)  this result means either that all three cross-price elasticicities   (eKL,  





from each of the first two equations so that the system of the two remaining equations 
contains  all  of  the  Allen  elasticities  of  substitution.    When  we  substitute  in  the 
expressions for  aij  and the price changes, we get equations (4) and (5) in the text.
31 
  Assuming  perfect  competition,  each  input  to  production  must  be  paid  a  price 
equal to its marginal product: 
  pXXK = r(1 + ￿K) = pYYK ,   
  pXXL = w(1 + ￿L) = pYYL,   
pYYZ = pZ = ￿Z. 
where  XK,  XL,  YK,  YL,  and  YZ  are the derivatives of the production functions with 
respect to each input.  Perfect competition and constant returns to scale assure that the 
value of output must equal the sum of factor payments: 
  pXX = r(1 + ￿K)KX + w(1 + ￿L)LX,   
  pYY = r(1 + ￿K)KY + w(1 + ￿L)LY + ￿ZZ.      
Totally differentiate these equations, divide through by sales revenue (pXX  or pYY), and 
rearrange terms to obtain equations (6) and (7) in the text. 
General Solution to the System 
  First, to eliminate   X ˆ   and  Y ˆ ,  subtract equation  (8) from equation (6) and 
equation (9) from equation (7): 
  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ w r p L XL K XK X + + + = t q t q    (A1) 
  Z YZ L YL K YK Y w r p t q t q t q ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ + + + + = .  (A2) 
Equations (A1-2) tell us how changes in net-of-tax factor prices are passed on to output 
prices, according to the factor shares in each industry.  Substituting equations (8) and (9) 
into equation (10) yields 
  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
X X Y Y u YZ Y YL Y YK X XL X XK p p Z L K L K t t s q q q q q - - + = - - - + .  (A3) 
Solving  equations  (1)  and  (2)  for  X K ˆ  and  X L ˆ ,  respectively,  and  substituting  these 
expressions in to equations (3) and (A3) gives us 
  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
K L X X L Y K r w L K t t s g g - - + = + - ,  (A4) 
  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( X X Y Y u YZ Y YL L XL Y YK K XK p p Z L K t t s q q g q q g q - - + = - + - + - .  (A5) 
Finally, to eliminate  Y K ˆ  and  Y L ˆ ,  we use equations (4) and (5) to solve for them and then 
substitute the resulting expressions into (A4) and (A5).  After some rearrangement, these 
equations become: 
Z ZZ KZ K ZZ LZ L YZ L ZL KL K ZL LL L YL
K ZK KK K ZK LK L YK K L K L X
e e e e w e e e e
r e e e e Z r w
t g g q t g g q
t g g q g g t t s
ˆ )] ( ) ( [ ) ˆ ˆ )]( ( ) ( [
) ˆ ˆ )]( ( ) ( [ ˆ ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (
- - - + + - - - +
+ - - - + - = - - + -
 
...(A6) 
                                                 





Z ZZ LZ L ZZ KZ K YZ L ZL LL L ZL KL K YL
K ZK LK L ZK KK K YK X X Y Y u
e e e e w e e e e
r e e e e Z C p p
t b b q t b b q
t b b q t t s
ˆ )] ( ) ( [ ) ˆ ˆ )]( ( ) ( [
) ˆ ˆ )]( ( ) ( [ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (
- + - + + - + - +
+ - + - + = - - + -
    
...(A7) 
At this point we reduce the generality of the system, allowing for a more interpretable 
solution.  Let   0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ = = = = L K Y X t t t t , so that the only tax changing is the pollution tax.  
Also, set good  X  as the numeraire, so that  0 ˆ = X p .  Then, plugging equation (A2) into 
(A7) to eliminate  Y p ˆ   yields, after some rearrangement: 
 
Z u ZZ LZ L ZZ KZ K YZ
u ZL LL L ZL KL K YL
u ZK LK L ZK KK K YK
e e e e
w e e e e
r e e e e Z C
t s b b q
s b b q
s b b q
ˆ ] ) ( ) ( [
ˆ ] ) ( ) ( [
ˆ ] ) ( ) ( [ ˆ
+ - + - -
+ - + - -
+ - + - - =
   (A8) 
Solve (A3) and (A8) for  Z ˆ ,  equate, and rearrange, to get: 
 
Z u K L LZ ZZ KZ ZZ YZ
X u L K ZL LL ZL KL YL
X u L K ZK LK ZK KK YK
e e B e e A
w C e e B e e A
r C e e B e e A
t s g g q
s s g g q
s s g g q
ˆ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( [
ˆ ] ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ( [
ˆ ] ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ( [
- + - + - - =
- - + - + - - +
+ - + - + - -
   (A9) 
Now equations (A1) and (A9) are two equations in only two unknowns, r ˆ and w ˆ .  Use 
(A1) to solve for  w ˆ   in terms of  r ˆ, substitute into (A9), and simplify, to reach equation 
(11b) in the text.  Substitute this back into previous equations to obtain the equations for  
r ˆ, Z ˆ , and  Y p ˆ  (11a, c, d).  
 